NEXIT part 2: just do it!

It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal

A few weeks ago I wrote an article for The Irish Catholic urging the twenty-three (of twenty-seven) EU member states currently also members of the US-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to leave NATO, giving this the sobriquet NEXIT. My rationale was and still is that it is the course of action which self-respect demands.

Since writing that piece, the US administration of President Donald J. Trump has given several more examples of what a highly unreliable partner it has become. The Trump administration’s actions are lending ever more credence to the remark attributed to Henry Kissinger that, while it may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, to be America’s friend is fatal.

In the past month alone, the US under Trump’s ‘leadership’:

• threatened to bomb Oman, a country which advocates a policy of constructive neutrality and respect for international law;
• cut short military exercises with South Korea as a sign of friendship to North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un (who once dubbed Trump a ‘dotard’);
• announced designation for sanctions against the Japanese president of the International Criminal Court;
• enacted swingeing tariffs on its northern neighbour and NATO stalwart, Canada, and issued an executive order changing the name of Lake Ontario to Lake America;
• decided to ‘help itself’ to a huge chunk of Venezuela’s oil reserves, which the American Catholic philosopher Edward Feser described as “another act of thuggery”;
• continued the (illegal?) war it launched with Israel against Iran on February 28.

With friends like the Trump administration…

What Sikorski’s view illustrates is that where  NATO is concerned, it’s not the outcome of any given operation that matters so much – it’s the all-important need to back America”

During the month of August the harrowing TV series Kabul was shown on BBC Four. It dramatised the last days before the Taliban re-took control of Afghanistan’s capital in August 2021. Having just watched the concluding two episodes the night before, it was surprising – one might even say surreal – to hear on the very next morning remarks by Poland’s Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. Speaking to the BBC World Service in an interview broadcast on August 30, he referred to NATO allies’ twenty-year involvement in Afghanistan as an example of NATO solidarity – he had been asked whether he thought NATO’s Art. 5 collective response clause would be respected or not. Given that the awful plight of Afghan women in particular under Taliban rule, Sikorski’s “take” beggared belief. What Sikorski’s view illustrates is that where  NATO is concerned, it’s not the outcome of any given operation that matters so much – it’s the all-important need to back America. And by the way, let’s not forget that the ‘deal’ with the Taliban was originated during Trump’s first term of office.

Addressing the practical implications

Addressing the practical implications of NEXIT is a daunting task. Accordingly, to get an idea of what the EU would need to do if all of those twenty-three EU member states did indeed leave NATO, I sought the assistance of an Artificial Intelligence platform called Perplexity a.i. I have quoted it in the accompanying text box.

The final paragraph is particularly noteworthy in that it highlights what it calls a “decisive deficiency”: the EU’s lack of political authority. In other words, the system of EU governance lacks comprehensive legitimacy – it suffers from a democratic deficit. The EU has the resources, but its hybrid governance arrangements mean that there’s a lack of political authority and legitimacy to deploy them effectively in a war-time context.

Brussels, we have a problem: political legitimacy in a time of war

One of the leading European thinkers on these issues is Prof. Sergio Fabbrini of LUISS University in Rome. He delivered a lecture on the opening day of the annual conference of the Council for European Studies (CES) which took place in June 2026 at UCD Belfield, and he has published a paper based on the lecture entitled ‘The European Union and the War: Supranational Enabling of Intergovernmentalism’.

The EU never had to confront the threat of war directly, precisely because of American protection, an experience that shaped its [the EU’s] institutionalisation”

He argues that the EU has not yet found a stable balance in its security governance, and that “The EU never had to confront the threat of war directly, precisely because of American protection, an experience that shaped its [the EU’s] institutionalisation”.

With the advent of Trump’s two Presidencies, the situation has changed dramatically. Fabbrini lists a number of pitfalls associated with intergovernmental decision-making – for example, “the difficulty of promoting collective action in the presence of multiple and mutually contradictory national preferences”.

Complicating factors for any new EU security and defence arrangements

A complicating factor making things more difficult concerns the United Kingdom. As we know, following the Brexit referendum of June 2016, the UK subsequently left the EU altogether. In the devising of new defence arrangements, the role and place of the UK is sure to figure. After all, some will say, the UK is a nuclear power and has a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (SECCO). To which I would reply…. “Yes, but…..” The UK does have a small nuclear weapons capability but in effect IT’s subject to American control.

The UK’s permanent seat on SECCO is at this stage a legacy from long ago which wouldn’t stand up to scrutiny in any serious management review. The same goes for France, by the way. In addition, the UK has very considerable economic problems – see the recently published book by A.G. Hopkins The Land Where Nothing Works – How Britain Lost the Plot (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 2026). pw Britain Loist the Plot’

Yet some highly qualified practitioners see an important role for the UK – e.g., Prof. Nathalie Tocci of Johns Hopkins University. In a recent paper for Bocconi University in Milan entitled ‘Towards a European Security Council’ she indicates that such a Council would likely include the UK, and well as some large and small EU member states (though she didn’t mention Ireland, mind you). To me this is a non-runner. Yes, the UK could be ‘associated’ with new arrangements, but not at the centre of them.

The reason why a war with Russia is so dangerous is the presence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Russia has an estimated total inventory of over 5,400 nuclear warheads”

However, the UK is sure to be ‘hanging around’, wanting in on any new dispensation. Psychologically, the UK is wedded to what it sees as its special relationship with the US, even if some months ago the UK Ambassador in Washington DC observed that the US’s special relationship is probably with Israel. One other point is what Prof. John J. Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago described recently as Britain’s “rich history of Russophobia” dating back at least to the 19th century.

Wolfgang Münchau, the Director of Eurointelligence, in a recent piece for Unherd.com on the case for de-escalation with Russia, noted that rhetorical escalation often precedes physical escalation.

He cited a recent essay by economist Branko Milanović of the City University of New York describing a very plausible escalation scenario, with Milanović saying that the thirst for war is palpable in the Nordic and Baltic countries and is also growing in the UK and Germany.

Münchau’s stark view is as follows: “The reason why a war with Russia is so dangerous is the presence of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Russia has an estimated total inventory of over 5,400 nuclear warheads. France has 290 and Britain has 225. Given the vast size of Russia, the French nuclear arsenal could make 0.1% of the Russian territory uninhabitable. The Russian nuclear arsenal could completely destroy all of Western Europe, and still have a lot of missiles left. This is not a war Europe can win.”

Let that sink in.

What is to be done?

During a recent episode of the Tucker Carlson show, the eminent academic, Prof. Stephen Walt of Harvard University – the number one university in the world according to last month’s Shanghai Rankings – ‘let slip’ an uncomfortable truth about Europe’s standing in relation to the US.

Mearsheimer said that the US and the west more generally are morally bankrupt, citing complicity in Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and its actions in the West Bank and southern Lebanon”

Looking at China’s evolving role in Asia, Walt said that from an American perspective it wouldn’t be desirable for China to enjoy the same relations with Asian countries that the US has with most countries in the western hemisphere, where those countries pay close attention to the US’s wishes and are very careful how they interact with the US, because the US tends to be pretty heavy-handed in how it deals with them – i.e. it’s a relationship of dominance by, and deference to, the US. I’m not ‘faulting’ Walt here – not at all. He was simply ‘telling it like it is’.

More home truths were given by Walt’s above-mentioned colleague Prof. John J. Mearsheimer.  Speaking on a recent episode of the Judging Freedom podcast, Mearsheimer said that the US and the west more generally are morally bankrupt, citing complicity in Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and its actions in the West Bank and southern Lebanon. He noted that the US and the Europeans support Israel at every turn.

In his recent article for the journal International Security entitled ‘The Iron Cage of International Anarchy’, Mearsheimer wrote of the EU that “There is no evidence that European states are going to abandon their sovereignty and join together to form the United States of Europe. If anything, recent trends point in the opposite direction.” But by being so subject to the US, they have already diluted and compromised their sovereignty.

So…what is to be done?

To cite Münchau again, “if the EU is good at one thing, it is coming up with technical solutions to complex problems”.

If all EU countries could break free from NATO they would not be so beholden to the US and could adopt a more ethical foreign policy.

Just as I am not advocating in any way for a policy of pacifism, neither am I calling for the EU to attempt to become a major military power. All that’s needed is a sufficiently strong and independent capability to deter would-be aggressors. Just do it!

Michael Sanfey is a Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies, Católica University Lisbon.

 

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The practicalities of NEXIT

If every EU member state left NATO, Europe could defend itself, but only after a dangerous transition. The EU has sufficient wealth, population, technology and military industry; what it lacks is a unified command structure, strategic enablers and an agreed nuclear guarantee. Its priority should therefore be to replace NATO’s functions, not merely increase national defence budgets.

Immediate political measures

• Turn Article 42(7) into an operational guarantee. The EU treaty already obliges every member to aid a state suffering armed aggression “by all the means in their power”. Governments should agree beforehand what assistance is automatic, including troop deployment, air defence, cyber response and logistical access.
• Create a European Defence Council. A small body of heads of government should be empowered to make emergency decisions by qualified majority rather than unanimity. [Note: I myself would strongly disagree with any move away from unanimity, or to exclude smaller member states from any new Council]
• Establish a permanent European operational headquarters. It would need NATO-style regional commands, standing contingency plans, integrated intelligence and authority to command assigned national forces.
• Manage the transition with Washington and London. Departing NATO abruptly would create a window of vulnerability. Intelligence, communications and logistics arrangements should remain in force until European replacements are operational.
• Nuclear deterrence would be the hardest issue. France would become the EU’s sole nuclear power, while Britain remained outside the Union. France’s 2026 “forward deterrence” concept already allows exercises, conventional support and temporary deployments elsewhere in Europe, but explicitly preserves exclusive French presidential control and stops short of a strict security guarantee. A post-NATO Europe would need to resolve that ambiguity politically. An independent EU nuclear arsenal would be legally and diplomatically far more problematic than extending the French deterrent.

The bottom line

The EU should not begin by proclaiming a single ‘European army.’ It should first create a binding political guarantee, a unified command, integrated high-readiness forces, shared strategic assets and a credible French-led nuclear umbrella. Europe has the economic capacity; its decisive deficiency is political authority. Without correcting that, higher spending would produce 27 better-equipped national militaries rather than a dependable continental defence system.

Source: Perplexity a.i.